The last cut of this magnitude was after the American Revolutionary War, when it was reduced to a paper strength of about 50,000 and a real strength of probably 35,000 – but then the population of Britain was only around six and a half million.
We are told that the slack will be taken up by the reserves, principally the Territorial Army, which will be maintained at a strength of 36,000: really?
The current strength of the Territorial Army is around 3000 but of these, only 20,000 are trained and of these again only 16,000 regularly attend for training.
And although we are told that the head count is to be increased, units are still being disbanded: in North Wales, for example, a traditionally fertile area for TA service, the infantry presence is to be reduced to a single company of 150 men!
So, far from being increased, the reality is more contraction.
In addition to this, it is an inconvenient fact that a reservist needs a month of weekly two-hour training nights to achieve what a regular soldier does in one working day of eight hours.
Then we have to consider the willingness of employers to release their people and pay for replacements and the cost of recompensing individuals for disparities in pay while mobilised.
TA officers and soldiers always do well on operations when integrated with their regular counterparts – the high level of operational gallantry awards is proof of that. And they have been doing it throughout their history. But this is not the point here.
We also have to consider the rate of turn-over. Historically, TA units turn over at least 10% of their trained strength every year – often twice that – so that to maintain a force of 36,000, the actual strength would have to be nearer 42,000.
We are told that the slack will be taken up by the reserves, principally the Territorial Army, which will be maintained at a strength of 36,000: really?
The current strength of the Territorial Army is around 3000 but of these, only 20,000 are trained and of these again only 16,000 regularly attend for training.
And although we are told that the head count is to be increased, units are still being disbanded: in North Wales, for example, a traditionally fertile area for TA service, the infantry presence is to be reduced to a single company of 150 men!
So, far from being increased, the reality is more contraction.
In addition to this, it is an inconvenient fact that a reservist needs a month of weekly two-hour training nights to achieve what a regular soldier does in one working day of eight hours.
Then we have to consider the willingness of employers to release their people and pay for replacements and the cost of recompensing individuals for disparities in pay while mobilised.
TA officers and soldiers always do well on operations when integrated with their regular counterparts – the high level of operational gallantry awards is proof of that. And they have been doing it throughout their history. But this is not the point here.
We also have to consider the rate of turn-over. Historically, TA units turn over at least 10% of their trained strength every year – often twice that – so that to maintain a force of 36,000, the actual strength would have to be nearer 42,000.
