By MATTHEW J. GOODWIN
JANUARY 11, 2017
LONDON — The
British Labour Party is in meltdown. After reviving the center-left in the
1990s, and then dominating British politics until 2010, Labour now faces the
gravest challenge in its 116-year history. One of the oldest social-democratic
parties in the world is fighting to survive; there is no guarantee it will.
Labour’s crisis
is a microcosm of the test that confronts social democracy at large. In polling,
Labour has fallen to its lowest level in generations. Shortly before Christmas,
the party’s support dropped
to 24 percent, which if repeated in a national election would mark its
lowest share of the vote since 1918. Forecasts
suggest that the number of Labour
seats in Parliament could slip from the 232 the party won in 2015 to 190 in
2020, its poorest showing since 1935.
The bad news does
not end there. In a recent election to fill a vacant parliamentary seat, Labour
suffered the humiliation of failing to reach even 5 percent of the vote. In
Scotland, where Labour lost all but one of its seats in 2015, leaked
internal polling not only put the
party a distant third behind the Scottish nationalists and the Conservatives,
but also offered this ominous warning: “There is no such thing as a core Labour
vote anymore.”
This week, a
report from the center-left Fabian Society suggested
that the Labour vote could fall in
the 2020 general election to as low as 20 percent because in previous elections
it has underperformed its midterm polling by an average of 8 points. This would
leave the main opposition party with only 140 to 150 seats in Parliament. The
report spoke “of insignificance, even of looming death.”
The Fabian
Society also
estimates that barely half of
Labour’s voters at the last election in 2015 remain loyal. The likelihood of
Labour’s coming annihilation is reflected in the leader’s favorability ratings
among Britain’s
politically engaged retirees: They put him a staggering 57
points behind the Conservative
leader, Theresa May. This man will never be prime minister.
Yet the crisis
within social democracy runs deeper than the failings of individuals. The
referendum last year on Britain’s membership in the European Union exposed a
deadly rift in social democracy’s increasingly fragile coalition. The problem
for the center-left is illustrated in the contrast between the affluent, leafy
North London constituency of Hornsey and Wood Green, where more than
three-quarters of voters chose
Remain, and the once industrial, now left-behind northern constituency of
Doncaster North, where nearly 70 percent voted Leave.
Both parliamentary seats are, for now, held by Labour.
The
irreconcilably different views of voters in Hornsey and Doncaster reflect a
widening divide that is eroding the electoral power of social democracy. It
derives from the incoherence of a coalition that depends simultaneously on
middle-class professionals in ethnically diverse liberal enclaves and
less-well-educated, working-class whites in communities that feel forgotten or
ignored.
That coalition is
now falling apart. The people of Doncaster are abandoning social democracy. The
defection of non-college-educated whites from the center-left was a central
lesson both of
Brexit and the 2016 American presidential
election.
None of this
should have been a surprise. More than three decades ago, the political
scientist Adam Przeworski described the growing dilemma for social democracy
posed by a growing middle class and declining number of blue-collar workers.
Progressives faced a choice: either stick with appealing to workers and risk
defeat, or appeal
to the ascendant middle class and
risk losing the workers. Most social-democratic parties chose the latter
strategy, so working-class loyalty gradually waned.
Today, the
dilemma has been sharpened by a further shift, the rise of the new cultural
divide that on another level is also cutting across the traditional social
democratic base and will, in time, become even more important than the fading
distinction between left and right.
This rift
probably always existed, but it has been highlighted by voters’ growing
preoccupation with migration and ethnic change, trends that were celebrated in
Hornsey but loathed in Doncaster. Against the backdrop of social democracy’s
fragmenting coalition, the divide over identity and values is bringing once
apathetic whites back to politics. New
research has found that one reason
for the Brexit camp’s victory was its success in mobilizing politically
disengaged, working-class whites who did not identify with any party and may not
have voted since Margaret Thatcher’s era.
In defiance of
Mr. Corbyn’s principles, these voters saw an opportunity to vent anger over
their sense of being neglected and their opposition to ethnic change. In
70 percent of Labour seats, they
helped to make Brexit a majority view.
Voters like those
in Doncaster now reject social democracy because social democrats failed to
recognize what the populists did: that left-behind whites are economically
protectionist and socially conservative; that they are deeply
anxious about economic disadvantage and threats to their identity, values and ways
of life. When social democrats tried to respond, they appealed halfheartedly to
economic protectionism, while ignoring these voters’ identity politics
altogether or clinging to a liberal commitment to open borders. And none of this
was communicated in terms that made sense to working-class voters.
This is why
Labour and its sister parties are constantly outflanked by populists and
conservatives who attack on both fronts. Recent analysis of European
social-democratic parties’ electoral performance has
shown that a consistent decline set
in around 2005 — before the financial crisis, but when immigration was already
fueling white anxiety. The trend will accelerate this year thanks to elections
in the Netherlands, France and Germany, where polls already put support for the
center-left way down.
Social
democracy’s electoral crisis has also exposed the left’s intellectual
bankruptcy. The Labour Party no longer owns a single area of policy in British
politics. When pollsters ask voters about the economy, housing, unemployment,
health care, law and order, Brexit or immigration, most say they either support
the governing Conservative Party or do not know which party to support. Amid
rising inequality and a stagnant economy, the party that was founded for workers
does not have a clear lead on any issue. Ideas have left the building.
The question of
what is to be done is not easily answered. In Denmark, where social democrats
have talked tough on immigration, they maintained support but still failed to
halt the advances of the populist right. In France, where socialists tried to
stick to principle, they face electoral oblivion, while the nationalist right
remains strong.
Since the Labour
Party itself is internally divided, with some members of Parliament calling for
controlled immigration while their leader doubles down on a policy of open
borders, its prospects for repairing its fractured electoral coalition seem
remote. Social democracy faced crises and defeats aplenty in the past, but its
future was never in doubt. Labour now raises that doubt.
